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Abstract—The primary purpose of a fingerprint recognition
system is to ensure a reliable and accurate user authentication,
but the security of the recognition system itself can be jeopardized
by spoof attacks. This study addresses the problem of developing
accurate, generalizable, and efficient algorithms for detecting
fingerprint spoof attacks. Specifically, we propose a deep con-
volutional neural network based approach utilizing local patches
centered and aligned using fingerprint minutiae. Experimental
results on three public-domain LivDet datasets (2011, 2013, and
2015) show that the proposed approach provides state-of-the-art
accuracies in fingerprint spoof detection for intra-sensor, cross-
material, cross-sensor, as well as cross-dataset testing scenarios.
For example, in LivDet 2015, the proposed approach achieves
99.03% average accuracy over all sensors compared to 95.51%
achieved by the LivDet 2015 competition winners. Additionally,
two new fingerprint presentation attack datasets containing more
than 20,000 images, using two different fingerprint readers, and
over 12 different spoof fabrication materials are collected. We
also present a graphical user interface, called Fingerprint Spoof
Buster, that allows the operator to visually examine the local
regions of the fingerprint highlighted as live or spoof, instead
of relying on only a single score as output by the traditional
approaches.
Index Terms—Fingerprint spoof detection, presentation attack
detection, convolutional neural networks, minutiae-based local
patches, liveness detection
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the ubiquitous deployment of fingerprint recogni-tion systems in many day-to-day applications, such as
financial transactions, international border security, unlocking
a smartphone, etc., the vulnerability of the system security
to presentation attacks is of growing concern [2], [3]. The
ISO standard IEC 30107-1:2016(E) [4] defines presentation
attacks as the “presentation to the biometric data capture
subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation of
the biometric system”. These attacks can be realized through
a number of methods including, but not limited to, use of
(i) gummy fingers [5], i.e. fabricated finger-like objects with
accurate imitation of another individual’s fingerprint ridge-
valley structures, (ii) 2D or 3D printed fingerprint targets [6],
[7], [8], (iii) altered fingerprints [9], i.e. intentionally tampered
or damaged real fingerprint patterns to avoid identification,
and (iv) cadaver fingers [10]. Among these, fingerprint spoof
attacks (i.e. gummy fingers and printed targets) are the most
common form of presentation attacks, with a multitude of
fabrication processes ranging from basic molding and casting
to utilizing sophisticated 2D and 3D printing techniques [5],
[6], [7], [8].
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Fig. 1. Fingerprint spoof attacks can be realized using various readily
available fabrication materials, such as PlayDoh, WoodGlue, Gelatin, etc.
Commonly available materials, such as gelatin, silicone,
play-doh, etc., have been utilized to generate fingerprint spoofs
(see Figs. 1 and 2), capable of circumventing a fingerprint
recognition system security with a reported success rate of
more than 70% [11]. For instance, in July 2016, researchers
at Michigan State University unlocked a fingerprint secure-
smartphone using a 2D printed fingerprint spoof to help police
with a homicide case1, using a technique proposed in [6]. In
Sept. 2013, shortly after Apple released iPhone 5s with inbuilt
TouchID fingerprint technology, Germany’s Chaos Computer
Club2 hacked its capacitive sensor by utilizing a high resolu-
tion photograph of the enrolled user’s fingerprint to fabricate
a spoof fingerprint with wood glue. In another incident, in
March 2013, a Brazilian doctor was arrested for using spoof
fingers made of silicone to fool the biometric attendance
system at a hospital in Sao Paulo3. Since then, many successful
1http://statenews.com/article/2016/08/how-msu-researchers-unlocked-a-
fingerprint-secure-smartphone-to-help-police-with-homicide-case
2http://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2013/ccc-breaks-apple-touchid
3http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-21756709
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Fig. 2. Visual comparison between (a) a live Fingerprint, and (b) the corresponding spoofs (of the same live finger) made with different materials. Images are
taken from LivDet-2011 dataset (Biometrika sensor) [12]. Our method can successfully distinguish between live and spoof fingerprints. The spoofness scores
for live fingerprint is 0.00, and for spoof fingerprints are 0.95, 0.97, 0.99, 0.99, and 0.95 for Ecoflex, Gelatin, Latex, Silgum, and Wood Glue, respectively.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON (AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ERROR [%]) OF SOFTWARE-BASED SPOOF DETECTION STUDIES [27], [29] ON LIVDET 2011,
2013, AND 2015 DATASETS.
Study Approach LivDet 2011 LivDet 2013* LivDet 2015
Ghiani et al. [22] Local Phase Quantization (LPQ) 11.1 3.0 N/A
Gragniello et al. [24] Weber Local Descriptor (WLD) 7.9 N/A N/A
Ghiani et al. [23] Binarized Statistical Image Features (BSIF) 7.2 2.1 N/A
Gragniello et al. [25] Local Contrast-Phase Descriptor (LCPD) 5.7 1.3 N/A
Nogueira et al. [27] Transfer Learning + CNN-VGG + Whole Image 4.5 1.1 4.5
Pala et al. [28] Custom CNN with triplet loss + Randomly selected
local patches
3.33 0.58 N/A
Proposed Approach CNN-MobileNet-v1 + Minutiae-based local patches 1.67 0.25 0.97
*LivDet 2013 includes results for Biometrika and Italdata sensors.
spoof attacks have highlighted the vulnerabilities of fingerprint
biometric systems4,5.
Fingerprint spoof detection methods are urgently needed
to thwart such attacks on fingerprint authentication systems,
thereby increasing the security and user confidence in such
systems. The various anti-spoofing approaches proposed in
the literature can be broadly classified into hardware-based
and software-based solutions [2], [10], [13]. The hardware-
based solutions typically require the fingerprint reader to
be augmented with sensor(s) to detect the characteristics of
vitality, such as blood flow [14], skin distortion [15], odor [16]
and so on. There are also special types of fingerprint sensors,
such as Lumidigm’s multispectral scanner [17] and Compact
Imaging’s multiple reference optical coherence tomography
(OCT) [18], that capture sub-dermal ridge patterns in the
finger. An open-source fingerprint reader with a two-camera
design provides two complementary streams of information
useful for spoof detection [19]. Software-based solutions, on
the other hand, extract features from the presented fingerprint
image (or a sequence of frames) acquired by the fingerprint
sensors, without incurring any additional hardware cost, to
differentiate between live and spoof fingers.
The software-based solutions published in the litera-
ture typically utilize one of the following approaches:
4http://fortune.com/2016/04/07/guy-unlocked-iphone-play-doh/
5https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/
(i) anatomical features (e.g. pore locations and their distribu-
tion [20]), (ii) physiological features (e.g. perspiration [21]),
or (iii) texture-based features (e.g. Local Phase Quantization
(LPQ) [22], Binarized Statistical Image Features (BSIF) [23],
and Weber Local Descriptor [24]). Gragniello et al. [25] pro-
posed a 2D local contrast-phase descriptor (LCPD), utilizing
both spatial and frequency domain information. In contrast to
the custom-tailored anti-spoof features, Menotti et al. [26],
Nogueira et al. [27], and Pala et al. [28] have proposed
convolutional neural network (CNN) based solutions whose
performances were shown to surpass many published spoof
detection algorithms (see Table I).
One of the limitations of many of the published anti-
spoof methods is their poor generalization performance across
spoof materials. Studies in [27], [30], [31] have shown that
when a spoof detector is evaluated on spoofs fabricated using
materials that were not seen during training, there can be up
to a three-fold increase in the spoof detection error rates. To
generalize an algorithm’s effectiveness across spoof fabrication
materials, called cross-material performance, some studies
have approached spoof detection as an open-set problem6.
Rattani et al. [31] applied the Weibull-calibrated SVM (W-
SVM), a variant of SVM based on properties of statistical
6Open-set problems address the possibility of spoof classes during testing,
that were not seen during training. Closed-set problems, on the other hand,
evaluate only those spoof classes that the system was trained on.
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Fig. 3. Example of a live fingerprint and corresponding spoof fingerprint, with
the artifacts introduced in the spoofs highlighted in red. The minutiae based
local patches extracted around the artifacts are also presented. The images
are taken from MSU Fingerprint Presentation Attack Dataset (MSU-FPAD)
- CrossMatch Sensor and the spoof material used is Silicone (Ecoflex). The
spoofness scores output by the proposed approach for the live and spoof
fingerprints are 0.06 and 0.99, respectively.
extreme value theory, to detect spoofs made of new materials.
Ding and Ross [32] trained an ensemble of multiple one-
class SVMs using textural features extracted from only live
fingerprint images.
A series of fingerprint Liveness Detection (LivDet) competi-
tions have been held since 2009 to advance state-of-the-art and
benchmark the proposed anti-spoofing solutions [33]. The best
performer in the most recent7 LivDet 2015 [13], Nogueira et
al. [27], utilized transfer learning, where deep CNNs originally
designed for object recognition and pre-trained on ImageNet
database [34], were fine-tuned on fingerprint images to differ-
entiate between live and spoof fingerprints. In their approach,
the networks were trained on whole fingerprint images resized
to 227 × 227 pixels for VGG [35] and 224 × 224 pixels for
AlexNet [36] as required by these networks. However, there
are three disadvantages of using this approach: (i) fingerprint
images from some of the sensors used in LivDet datasets, such
as Crossmatch L Scan Guardian (640×480), have a large blank
area (≥ 50%) surrounding the friction ridge region. Directly
resizing these images, from 640×480 to 227×227, eventually
results in the friction ridge area occupying less than 10%
of the original image size; (ii) resizing a rectangular image
of size, say w × h, to a square image, say p × p, leads to
different amounts of information retained in the two spatial
image dimensions; (iii) downsizing an image, in general, leads
to a significant loss of discriminatory information.
It is important to consider various sources of noise involved
in the spoof fabrication process itself that can introduce some
artifacts, such as missing friction ridge regions, cracks, air
bubbles, etc., in the spoofs. The primary consequence of
such artifacts is the creation of spurious minutiae in the
fingerprint images sensed from spoofs. The local regions
around these spurious minutiae can, therefore, provide salient
cues to differentiate a spoof fingerprint from live fingerprints
(see Fig. 3). We utilize this observation to train a two-class
CNN using local patches around the extracted minutiae, as
opposed to the whole fingerprint images or randomly selected
local patches, to design a fingerprint spoof detector. We show
that this approach is more robust to novel fabrication materials
than earlier approaches that utilize the whole image [27] or
randomly selected local patches [28].
The proposed approach, utilizing local patches of size p×p,
(p = 96), centered at minutiae, (i) addresses the previously
mentioned drawbacks of downsizing whole fingerprint images
to train the CNN, (ii) provides large amount of data (an
average of 48 patches/fingerprint image), sufficient to train
the deep CNN architectures from scratch without overfitting,
(iii) learns salient textural information from local regions,
robust to differentiate between spoof and live fingerprints, and
(iv) provides a fine-grained representation of the fingerprint
images capable of localizing partial spoof fingerprints and
fingerprint alterations. The output of the CNN is a confidence
score in the range [0 − 1], defined as Spoofness Score;
higher the spoofness score, more likely the patch is extracted
from a spoof fingerprint. For a given image, the spoofness
scores corresponding to the minutiae-based local patches are
averaged to give the global spoofness score for the whole
image. Furthermore, a fusion of CNN models trained on
multi-scale patches (ranging in size from from 64 × 64 to
128× 128), centered and aligned using minutiae, is shown to
further boost the spoof detection performance.
7Results of LivDet 2017 are expected to be presented at the 11th IAPR
International Conference on Biometrics (ICB), Brisbane, Feb. 20-23, 2018.
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Fig. 4. An overview of the proposed approach for fingerprint spoof detection using CNNs trained on local patches centered and aligned using minutiae
location and orientation, respectively.
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF THE LIVENESS DETECTION (LIVDET) DATASETS UTILIZED IN THIS STUDY.
Dataset LivDet 2011 [12] LivDet 2013 [39] LivDet 2015 [13]
Fingerprint
Reader
Biometrika ItalData Digital
Persona
Sagem Biometrika ItalData GreenBit Biometrika Digital
Persona
CrossMatch
Model FX2000 ET10 4000B MSO300 FX2000 ET10 DactyScan26 HiScan-PRO U.are.U 5160 L Scan Guardian
Image Size 315× 372 640× 480 355× 391 352× 384 315× 372 640× 480 500× 500 1000×1000 252× 324 640× 480
Resolution (dpi) 500 500 500 500 569 500 500 1000 500 500
#Live Images
1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1510/1500
Train / Test
#Spoof Images
1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1000 1000/1500 1000/1500 1000/1500 1473/1448
Train / Test
Cooperative
Subject*
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spoof Materials Ecoflex, Gelatine,
Latex, Silgum, Wood
Glue
Gelatine, Latex, Play
Doh, Silicone, Wood
Glue
Ecoflex, Gelatine,
Latex, Modasil, Wood
Glue
Ecoflex, Gelatine, Latex, Wood Glue,
Liquid Ecoflex, RTV
Body Double,
Ecoflex, Play
Doh, OOMOO,
Gelatin
*In the cooperative subject scenario, a subject willingly provides a negative impression of the fingerprint as a mold, while in the non-cooperative subject
scenario, the fingerprint mold is created by using the latent fingerprint lifted off a surface touched by the subject.
LivDet datasets are available to interested researchers at http://livdet.org/registration.php.
The main contributions of this study are enumerated below.
They also highlight the differences between this paper and our
preliminary study [1]:
• Utilized fingerprint domain-knowledge to design a robust
fingerprint spoof detector, where local patches centered
and aligned using fingerprint minutiae are utilized for
training a CNN model. This differs from other published
approaches which have generally used the whole finger-
print image for spoof detection.
• A fine-grained representation of fingerprint images using
local patches capable of detecting partial spoof fingerprint
regions and fingerprint alterations.
• Experimental results on publicly available datasets
(LivDet 2011, 2013, and 2015), including intra-sensor,
cross-material, cross-sensor, and cross-dataset scenarios,
show that the proposed approach outperforms the state-
of-the-art results published on these three datasets. For
example, in LivDet 2015, our algorithm achieves 99.03%
average accuracy over all sensors compared to 95.51%
achieved by the LivDet 2015 winner [13].
• Real-time spoof detection by using MobileNet-v1 [37],
compared to Inception-v3 [38] used in the preliminary
study [1]. The average classification time for a single
input image on a NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti GPU is 100ms
compared to 800ms for Inception-v3 network.
• Collected two new fingerprint presentation attack
datasets8 containing more than 20, 000 fingerprint im-
ages, using two different fingerprint readers and over 12
different spoof fabrication materials.
• Developed a graphical user interface (GUI) for real-
time fingerprint spoof detection, called Fingerprint Spoof
Buster, which allows the fingerprint reader operator to
visually examine the local regions of the fingerprint
highlighted as live or spoof, instead of relying on a single
score, as output by the traditional approaches.
II. PROPOSED SPOOF DETECTION APPROACH
The proposed approach includes two stages, an offline
training stage and an online testing stage. The offline training
stage involves (i) detecting minutiae in the sensed fingerprint
image (live or spoof), (ii) extracting local patches centered and
aligned using minutiae location and orientation, respectively,
and (iii) training MobileNet models on the aligned local
patches. During the testing stage, the spoof detection decision
is made based on the average of spoofness scores for individual
patches output from the MobileNet model. An overview of the
proposed approach is presented in Fig. 4.
A. Datasets
The following datasets have been utilized in this study:
8These datasets will be made available to interested researchers once this
paper is accepted for publication.
5TABLE III
SUMMARY OF THE MSU FINGERPRINT PRESENTATION ATTACK DATASET (MSU-FPAD) AND PRECISE BIOMETRICS SPOOF-KIT DATASET (PBSKD).
Dataset MSU-FPAD Precise Biometrics Spoof-Kit
Fingerprint Reader CrossMatch Lumidigm CrossMatch Lumidigm
Model Guardian 200 Venus 302 Guardian 200 Venus 302
Image Size 750× 800 400× 272 750× 800 400× 272
Resolution (dpi) 500 500 500 500
#Live Images
2, 250 / 2, 250 2, 250 / 2, 250 250 / 250† 250 / 250†
Train / Test
#Spoof Images
3, 000 / 3, 000 2, 250 / 2, 250 250 / 250 200 / 200‡
Train / Test
Cooperative* Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spoof Materials Ecoflex, PlayDoh, 2D Print (Matte Paper), 2D Print
(Transparency)
Ecoflex, Gelatin, Latex body paint, Ecoflex with silver colloidal ink coating, Ecoflex
with BarePaint coating, Ecoflex with Nanotips coating, Crayola Model Magic, Wood
glue, Monster Liquid Latex, and 2D printed fingerprint on office paper
†1000 randomly sampled live fingerprint images from MSU-FPAD are selected for Precise Biometrics Spoof-Kit Dataset.
‡ Lumidigm fingerprint reader does not image Silicone (EcoFlex) spoofs with NanoTips and BarePaint coatings.
Live	Fingerprint Silicone	(Ecoflex) 2D	Printed	
(Matte	Paper)
2D	Printed	
(Transparency	Film)
(a)	Imaged	using	CrossMatch	Guardian	200	fingerprint	reader (b)	Imaged	using	Lumidigm	Venus	302	fingerprint	reader
PlayDoh
(Orange)
Live	Fingerprint Silicone	(Ecoflex) 2D	Printed	
(Matte	Paper)
2D	Printed	
(Transparency	Film)
Unable	to	Image
PlayDoh
(Orange)
Fig. 5. Example images from MSU Fingerprint Presentation Attack Dataset (MSU-FPAD) acquired using (a) CrossMatch Guardian 200, and (b) Lumidigm
Venus 302 fingerprint readers. Note that Lumidigm reader does not image PlayDoh (orange) spoofs.
1) LivDet Datasets: In order to evaluate performance of
the proposed approach, we utilized LivDet 2011 [12], LivDet
2013 [39], and LivDet 2015 [13] datasets. Each of these
datasets contains over 16, 000 fingerprint images, acquired
from four different fingerprint readers, with equal numbers of
live and spoof fingerprints that are equally split between train-
ing and testing sets. However, the CrossMatch and Swipe read-
ers from LivDet 2013 dataset were not utilized for evaluation
purposes because the (a) LivDet competition organizers found
anomalies in the fingerprint data from CrossMatch reader
and discouraged its use for comparative evaluations [33], and
(b) the resolution of fingerprint images output from Swipe
reader is very low, i.e. 96 dpi. Unlike other LivDet datasets,
spoof fingerprint images from Biometrika and Italdata readers
in LivDet 2013 dataset [39] are fabricated using the non-
cooperative method i.e. without user cooperation. It should
be noted that in LivDet 2015, the testing set included spoofs
fabricated using new materials, that were not known in the
training set. These new materials included liquid ecoflex and
RTV for Biometrika, Digital Persona, and Green Bit readers,
and OOMOO and gelatin for Crossmatch reader. Table II
presents a summary of the LivDet datasets used in this study.
2) MSU Fingerprint Presentation Attack Dataset: In ad-
dition to utilizing LivDet Datasets, we collected a large
dataset, called the MSU Fingerprint Presentation Attack
Dataset (MSU-FPAD), using two different fingerprint readers,
namely, CrossMatch Guardian 200 and Lumidigm Venus 302.
There are a total of 9, 000 live images and 10, 500 spoof
images captured using these two readers and 4 different spoof
fabrication materials, namely, ecoflex, playhoh, 2D printed
on matte paper, and 2D printed on transparency film. The
selection of the fingerprint readers and the spoof materials
is based on the requirements of IARPA ODIN program9 eval-
uation. This dataset will be further augmented with additional
subjects, spoof fabrication materials, and fingerprint readers.
Fig. 5 presents some example fingerprint images, and Table III
presents a summary of the MSU Fingerprint Presentation
Attack Dataset.
3) Precise Biometrics Spoof-Kit Dataset: We also collected
another dataset6 containing high quality 900 spoof fingerprint
images fabricated using 10 different types of spoof materials,
namely, (i) Ecoflex, (ii) Gelatin, (iii) Latex body paint, (iv)
Ecoflex with silver colloidal ink coating, (v) Ecoflex with
BarePaint coating, (vi) Ecoflex with Nanotips coating, (vii)
Crayola Model Magic, (viii) Wood glue, (ix) Monster Liquid
Latex, and (x) 2D printed fingerprint on office paper. The
spoof specimens used for this dataset are taken from Precise
Biometrics10 Spoof-Kit containing 10 specimens per spoof
type, for a total of 100 spoof specimens. Each spoof specimen
is imaged 5 times using two fingerprint readers, namely,
CrossMatch Guardian 200 and Lumidigm Venus 302. Note
that Lumidigm reader does not image Silicone (EcoFlex)
spoofs with NanoTips and BarePaint coatings. An additional
900 randomly sampled live fingerprints from MSU-FPAD are
9https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/odin/odin-baa
10https://precisebiometrics.com/
6(a)	Imaged	using	CrossMatch	Guardian	200	fingerprint	reader
(b)	Imaged	using	Lumidigm	Venus	302	fingerprint	reader
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Fig. 6. Example images from Precise Biometrics Spoof-Kit Dataset (PBSKD) acquired using (a) CrossMatch Guardian 200, and (b) Lumidigm Venus 302
fingerprint readers. Note that Lumidigm reader does not image Silicone (EcoFlex) spoofs with NanoTips and BarePaint coatings.
selected for a total of 1, 800 fingerprint images in Precise
Biometrics Spoof-Kit Dataset. Fig. 6 presents some example
fingerprint images, and Table III presents a summary of the
Precise Biometrics Spoof-Kit Dataset.
B. Minutiae Detection
The fingerprint minutiae are extracted using the algorithm
from [40]. The three LivDet datasets (LivDet 2011, 2013,
and 2015) comprise of fingerprint images captured at varying
resolutions, ranging from 500 dpi to 1000 dpi. Since the
minutiae detector in [40] was designed for 500 dpi images, all
fingerprint images are resized to ensure a standard resolution
of 500 dpi. A standard resolution for all the fingerprint images
is also crucial to ensure similar amount of friction ridge area
in each local patch, irrespective of the fingerprint reader used.
An average of 46 minutiae (s.d. = 6.2) and 50 minutiae (s.d. =
6.9) are detected per live image and spoof image, respectively,
for the LivDet datasets.
C. Local Patch Extraction
For a given fingerprint image I with k detected minutiae
points M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk}, where mi = {xi, yi, θi}, i.e.
the minutiae mi is defined in terms of spatial coordinates (xi,
yi) and orientation (θi), a corresponding set of k local patches
L = {l1, l2, . . . , lk}, each of size [q×q] where (q =
√
2p), are
extracted. Each local patch li, centered at the corresponding
minutia location (xi, yi), is aligned11 based on the minutiae
orientation (θi). After alignment, the central region of size
[p×p] (p = 96) is cropped from the rotated patch and used for
training the CNN model (see Fig. 4). The size of larger patch
is fixed to [
√
2p × √2p] to prevent any loss of information
during patch alignment. Fig. 8 presents examples of real and
spoof fingerprint images and the corresponding local patches
centered around minutiae points before alignment.
11MATLAB’s imrotate function with bilinear interpolation is used to rotate
the local patch for alignment.
For evaluating the impact of local patch size on the spoof
detection performance, we also explore use of multi-resolution
patches of size p ∈ {64, 96, 128} for training independent
CNN models and their fusion. All the local patches are
resized12 to 224×224 as required by the Mobilenet-v1 model.
D. MobileNet CNN
Since the success of AlexNet [36] for object detection in
ILSVRC-2012 [34], different CNN architectures have been
proposed in literature, such as VGG, GoogleNet (Inception
v1-v4), ResNets, MobileNet, etc. Nogueira et al. [27], winner
of LivDet 2015, utilized a pre-trained VGG architecture [35]
to achieve the best performance in LivDet 2015 [13]. In this
study, we utilize the MobileNet-v1 architecture [37] because
it offers the following advantages over VGG and Inception-v3
architectures: (i) MobileNet-v1 is designed using depth-wise
separable convolutions, originally introduced in [41], provid-
ing drastic decrease in model size and training/evaluation times
while providing better spoof detection performance, (ii) it is a
low-latency network requiring only 100ms to classify an input
fingerprint image as live or spoof compared to 800ms required
by Inception-v3 network [1], (iii) the number of model param-
eters to be trained in MobileNet-v1 (4.24M), is significantly
smaller than the number of model parameters in Inception-
v3 (23.2M) and VGG (138M), requiring significantly lower
efforts in terms of regularization and data augmentation, to
prevent overfitting [37].
We utilized the TF-Slim library13 implementation of the
MobileNet-v1 architecture. The last layer of the architecture,
a 1000-unit softmax layer (originally designed to predict the
1, 000 classes of ImageNet dataset), was replaced with a 2-
unit softmax layer for the two-class problem, i.e. live vs.
spoof. The optimizer used to train the network was RMSProp
12TensorFlow’s resize utility with bilinear interpolation was used; available at
https://www.tensorflow.org/api docs/python/tf/image/resize images
13https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/slim
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Fig. 7. The proposed approach provides a fine-grained representation for spoof detection by using minutiae-based local patches. A fingerprint spoof fabricated
using silicone which conceals only a partial region of the live finger is shown in (a) and the imaged fingerprint in (b) (enclosed in red). The proposed approach
extracts and evaluates the minutiae-based local patches, and highlights the local regions as live (in green) or spoof (in red) as shown in (c) and (d). It can
also highlight the regions of fingerprint alterations as shown for a “Z” cut altered fingerprint in (e), (f) and (g). The proposed approach detected (b) and (e)
as spoofs with the spoofness scores of 0.78 and 0.65, respectively.
0.00
0.00
0.12
0.85
0.78
1.00
0.94
0.53
0.91
0.40
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
Fig. 8. Local patches extracted around the fingerprint minutiae for (a) real
fingerprint, and (b) spoof fingerprint (gelatin). The spoofness score for each
patch is in the range [0−1]; higher the score, more likely the patch is extracted
from a spoof fingerprint. For a given input test image, the spoofness scores
corresponding to the local patches are averaged to give a global spoofness
score. The final decision is made based on a classification threshold learned
from the training dataset; an image with a global spoofness score below the
threshold is classified as live, otherwise as spoof.
with asynchronous gradient descent and a batch size of 100.
Data augmentation techniques, such as brightness adjustment,
random cropping, vertical flipping are employed to ensure the
trained model is robust to the possible variations in fingerprint
images. For the multi-resolution local patches, a separate
network is trained for each patch size with the same parameters
as mentioned above.
E. Fine-grained Fingerprint Image Representation
Partial spoofs and fingerprint alterations are not a rare means
to avoid re-identification14, by masking the true identity from a
fingerprint biometric system [9], [42]. Spoof detectors trained
on the whole fingerprint images are inadvertently ineffective
against localizing partial spoof fingerprints, that conceal only
a limited region of the live finger. Moreover, in many smart-
phones and other embedded systems that only sense a partial
14http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/GadgetGuide/
surgically-altered-fingerprints-woman-evade-immigration/story?id=
9302505
region (friction ridge area) of the fingerprint due to small
sensor area (typically 150× 150), it is very crucial to have a
detailed representation of the sensed fingerprint region. One of
the key advantages of employing a patch-based approach is the
fine-grained representation of input fingerprint image for spoof
detection. Fig. 7 (a) presents an example of a fingerprint spoof
fabricated using silicone, concealing only a partial region of
the live finger and Fig. 7 (b) presents the imaged partial
spoof fingerprint using a CrossMatch Guardian 200 fingerprint
reader. The proposed approach, utilizing minutiae-based local
patches, highlights the local regions as live or spoof (shown
in Figs. 7 (c) and (d) in green and red, respectively), pro-
viding a fine-grained representation of the fingerprint image.
Fingerprint alterations, such as cuts, mutilations, stitches,
etc., performed using surgical and chemical procedures (see
Fig. 7 (e)), create spurious minutiae as shown in Figs. 7 (f)
and (g). The proposed approach is able to highlight the regions
of fingerprint alterations despite not being trained specifically
on altered fingerprint database, indicating the generalizability
of the proposed approach. The proposed approach detected
both fingerprint images in Figs. 7 (b) and (e) as spoofs with
the spoofness scores of 0.78 and 0.65, respectively.
F. Spoofness Score
The output from the softmax layer of the trained MobileNet-
v1 model is in the range [0−1], called as the Spoofness Score.
The larger the spoofness score, the higher the support that
the input local patch belongs to the spoof class (see Fig. 8).
For an input test image I , the spoofness scores sIi∈{1,2,...,k}
corresponding to the k minutiae-based local patches of size
p × p, extracted from the input image, are averaged to give
a global spoofness score SI . In case of multi-resolution local
patches, the global spoofness scores (SIpi ) based on each local
patch size, pi ∈ {64, 96, 128}, are averaged to produce a final
spoofness score. The threshold that minimizes the average
classification error on training dataset is learned and utilized
as the classification threshold. An image with a spoofness
score below the threshold is classified as live, otherwise as
spoof. The learned threshold performed slightly better in spoof
detection than selecting a pre-defined threshold of 0.5.
8(e)	Modified	Spoof	Patch	
(after	noise	removal)
(a)	Live	Fingerprint	Patch
(c)	Spoof	Fingerprint	Patch
(b)	Spoofness	Score	=	0.00	
(d)	Spoofness	Score	=	0.99	
(f)	Spoofness	Score	=	0.94	
Minutiae-based	Local	Patches Feature	Representations	of	
Local	Patch
Fig. 9. Illustrating the embeddings of minutiae-based local patches (96×96),
for (a) live patch, (c) spoof patch, and (e) modified spoof patch, in 1024-
dimensional feature space from MobileNet-v1 bottleneck layer, transformed
to 32 × 32 heat maps, (b), (d), and (e), respectively, for visualization. A
high spoofness score for the modified spoof patch despite removal of artifacts
indicates the robustness of the proposed approach.
G. On Robustness of Patch-based Representation
As mentioned in Section-1, the proposed patch-based ap-
proach addresses several drawbacks of using whole fingerprint
images for training deep CNN architectures. While the pro-
posed approach is based on the premise that it is capable of
capturing discriminatory information from local patches, such
as missing ridges, air bubbles, etc., from spoof fingerprints,
we also examine the robustness of patch-based representation
by evaluating it in absence of such artifacts. Figs. 9 (a) and
(c) present minutiae-based local patches from a live finger-
print and the corresponding spoof fingerprint (fabricated using
EcoFlex), respectively, for the same minutia point. Figs. 9 (b)
and (d) present the feature representations of the local patches
shown in Figs. 9 (a) and (c), respectively, obtained from the
bottleneck layer of the MobileNet-v1 architecture. The 1024-
dimensional feature representation is transformed to 32 × 32
heatmap for visualization. The spoofness scores for the two
patches are 0.00 (Fig. 9 (b)) and 0.99 (Fig. 9 (d)), respectively.
The spoof patch (Fig. 9 (c)) is modified, by the authors, using
an open-source photo-editing utility, called GIMP15, to remove
the visible artifacts and produce the modified spoof fingerprint
patch as shown in Fig. 9 (e). The feature representation for
the modified patch is shown in Fig. 9 (f). A high spoofness
score for the modified spoof patch (0.94) despite removal of
artifacts indicates the robustness of the proposed approach.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Performance Evaluation Metrics
The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated
following the metrics used in LivDet [33].
• F errlive: Percentage of misclassified live fingerprints.
• F errfake16: Percentage of misclassified spoof finger-
prints.
The average classification error (ACE) is defined as:
ACE =
Ferrlive + Ferrfake
2
(1)
Additionally, we also report the F errfake @ F errlive =
1% for each of the experiments as reported in [33]. This
value represents the percentage of spoofs able to breach the
biometric system security when the reject rate of legitimate
users ≤ 1%.
B. Results
The proposed approach is evaluated under the following
four scenarios of fingerprint spoof detection, which reflect
an algorithm’s robustness against new spoof materials, use of
different sensors and/or different environments.
1) Intra-Sensor, Known Spoof Materials: In this setting,
all the training and testing images are captured using the
same sensor, and all spoof fabrication materials utilized in the
test set are known a priori. Our experimental results show
that training the MobileNet-v1 model from scratch, using
minutiae-based local patches, performs better than fine-tuning
a pre-trained network, as reported in [27]. The large amount
of available data, in the form of local fingerprint patches,
is sufficient to train the deep architecture of MobileNet-
v1 model without over-fitting. Also, a score level fusion of
the proposed MobileNet-v1 model trained on local patches,
with an independent MobileNet-v1 model trained on whole
fingerprint images does not offer any advantage in terms of
performance improvement. This observation was also made
in our preliminary study [1] which employed Inception-v3
model [38]. It was reported in [33] that most of the algorithms
submitted to LivDet 2015 did not perform well on Digital
15https://www.gimp.org/
16When all the spoof fabrication materials are known during the training,
this metric is referred to as Ferrfake known, and in case all the spoof
fabrication materials to be encountered during testing are not known during
training, this metric is referred to as Ferrfake unknown.
9TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED APPROACH (BOTTOM) AND STATE-OF-THE-ART (TOP) REPORTED ON LIVDET 2015
DATASET [13]. SEPARATE NETWORKS ARE TRAINED ON THE TRAINING IMAGES CAPTURED BY EACH OF THE FOUR FINGERPRINT READERS. Ferrfake
known AND Ferrfake unknown CORRESPOND TO KNOWN SPOOF MATERIALS AND CROSS-MATERIAL SCENARIOS, RESPECTIVELY.
St
at
e-
of
-t
he
-A
rt
[1
3] LivDet 2015 Ferrlive (%) Ferrfake† (%) Ferrfake
known (%)
Ferrfake
unknown* (%)
ACE (%) Ferrfake (%) @
Ferrlive= 1% [33]
GreenBit 3.50 5.33 4.30 7.40 4.60 17.90
Biometrika 8.50 3.73 2.70 5.80 5.64 15.20
Digital Persona 8.10 5.07 4.60 6.00 6.28 19.10
Crossmatch 0.93 2.90 2.12 4.02 1.90 2.66
Average 4.78 4.27 3.48 5.72 4.49 13.24
Pr
op
os
ed
A
pp
ro
ac
h LivDet 2015 Ferrlive (%) Ferrfake† (%) Ferrfake
known (%)
Ferrfake
unknown* (%)
ACE (%) Ferrfake (%) @
Ferrlive = 1%
GreenBit 0.50 0.80 0.30 1.80 0.68 0.53
Biometrika 0.90 1.27 0.60 2.60 1.12 1.20
Digital Persona 1.97 1.17 0.85 1.80 1.48 1.96
Crossmatch 0.80 0.48 0.82 0.00 0.64 0.28
Average 1.02 0.93 0.64 1.48 0.97 0.96
† Ferrfake includes spoofs fabricated using both known and previously unseen materials. It is an average of Ferrfake-known and Ferrfake-unknown,
weighted by the number of samples in each category.
*The unknown spoof materials in LivDet 2015 test dataset include Liquid Ecoflex and RTV for Green Bit, Biometrika, and Digital Persona sensors, and
OOMOO and Gelatin for Crossmatch sensor.
TABLE V
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED APPROACH AND
STATE-OF-THE-ART RESULTS REPORTED ON LIVDET 2011 AND
LIVDET 2013 DATASETS FOR INTRA-SENSOR EXPERIMENTS IN TERMS OF
AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ERROR (ACE) AND
FERRFAKE @ FERRLIVE = 1%.
Dataset State-of-the-Art Proposed Approach
LivDet 2011 ACE (%) ACE (%) Ferrfake @
Ferrlive = 1%
Biometrika 4.90 [25] 1.24 1.41
Digital Persona 1.85 [28] 1.61 3.25
ItalData 5.10 [28] 2.45 7.21
Sagem 1.23 [28] 1.39 4.33
Average 3.27 1.67 4.05
LivDet 2013
Biometrika 0.65 [28] 0.20 0.00
ItalData 0.40 [27] 0.30 0.10
Average 0.53 0.25 0.05
Persona sensor due to the small image size. Our approach
based on local patches does not suffer from this limitation.
Tables IV and V present the performance comparison between
the proposed approach and the state-of-the-art results for the
LivDet datasets utilized in this study. Table VI presents the
performance of the proposed approach on MSU Fingerprint
Presentation Attack Dataset (MSU-FPAD) and Precise Bio-
metrics Spoof-Kit Dataset (PBSKD). Independent MobileNet-
v1 networks are trained for each evaluation. Note that in
LivDet 2015 (Table IV), this scenario is represented by the
Ferrfake known. For LivDet 2011 and 2013, MSU-FPAD, and
PBSKD datasets (Table V), all spoof materials in the test
set were known during training. Fig. 10 presents example
fingerprint images for Biometrika sensor from LivDet 2015
TABLE VI
AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ERROR (ACE),
FERRFAKE @ FERRLIVE = 0.1% AND FERRLIVE = 1% ON THE MSU
FINGERPRINT PRESENTATION ATTACK DATASET (MSU-FPAD) AND
PRECISE BIOMETRICS SPOOF-KIT DATASET (PBSKD) FOR
INTRA-SENSOR EXPERIMENTS.
Dataset Proposed Approach
MSU-FPAD ACE (%) Ferrfake @
Ferrlive = 0.1%
Ferrfake @
Ferrlive = 1%
CrossMatch Guardian 200 0.08 0.11 0.00
Lumidigm Venus 302 3.94 10.03 1.30
Average 2.01 5.07 0.65
PBSKD
CrossMatch Guardian 200 2.02 5.32 0.65
Lumidigm Venus 302 1.93 3.84 0.33
Average 1.98 4.66 0.51
dataset that were correctly and incorrectly classified by the
proposed approach.
We also evaluate the impact of local patch size on the
performance of the proposed approach, by comparing the per-
formance of three CNN models trained on minutiae-centered
local patches of size [p×p] where p = {64, 96, 128}, extracted
from the fingerprint images captured by Biometrika sensor
for LivDet 2011 dataset. Among these three models, the one
trained on local patches of size [96× 96] performed the best.
However, a score-level fusion, using average-rule, of the three
models reduced the average classification error (ACE) from
1.24% to 0.88%, and Ferrfake from 1.41% to 0.58% @ Fer-
rlive = 1%. Similar performance gains were observed for other
sensors, but there is a trade off between the performance gain
and the computational requirements for spoof detector. In order
to evaluate the significance of utilizing minutiae locations for
extracting local patches, we trained independent MobileNet-
v1 models on a similar number of local patches, extracted
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(a)	Correctly	classified	live	fingerprint
Spoofness	Score	=	0.14
(b)	Correctly	classified	spoof	fingerprint
Spoofness	Score	=	0.98
(c)	Incorrectly	classified	live	fingerprint
Spoofness	Score	=	0.88
(d)	Incorrectly	classified	spoof	fingerprint
Spoofness	Score	=	0.49
Fig. 10. Example live and spoof fingerprints for Biometrika sensor from LivDet 2015 dataset, correctly and incorrectly classified by our proposed approach.
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Fig. 11. ROC curves for live v. spoof classification of fingerprint images
from LivDet 2011 Dataset (Biometrika sensor) utilizing (i) whole image, (ii)
randomly selected patches [96 × 96], (iii) minutiae-based patches of size
[p×p], p ∈ {64, 96, 128}, (iv) score-level fusion of multi-resolution patches.
randomly from LivDet 2015 datasets. It was observed that the
models trained on minutiae-centered local patches achieved a
significantly higher reduction (78%) in average classification
error, compared to the reduction (33%) achieved by the models
trained on randomly sampled local patches. Fig. 11 illustrates
that (i) features extracted from local patches provide better
spoof detection accuracy than the whole image, (ii) patches
selected around minutiae perform better than random patches
of the same size, (iii) 96× 96 patch performs the best among
the three patch sizes considered, and (iv) score-level fusion
of multi-resolution local patches boosts the spoof detection
performance.
2) Intra-Sensor, Cross-Material: In this setting, the same
sensor is used to capture all training and testing images, but
the spoof images in the testing set are fabricated using new
materials that were not seen during training. For the first set of
cross-material experiments, we utilize the LivDet 2015 dataset
which contains two new spoof materials in the testing set
for each sensor, i.e. Liquid Ecoflex and RTV for Green Bit,
Biometrika, and Digital Persona sensors, and OOMOO and
Gelatin for Crossmatch sensor. The performance of the pro-
posed approach on cross-material experiments for LivDet 2015
dataset is presented in Table IV (column F errfake unknown)
and is compared with the state-of-the-art performance reported
in [13]. A significant reduction in the error rate is achieved
by the proposed method. For better generalizability, a second
set of cross-material experiments are performed on LivDet
2011 and LivDet 2013 datasets, following the protocol adopted
by the winner of LivDet 2015 [27]. Table VII presents the
achieved error rates on these experiments, along with the spoof
fabrication materials used in training and testing sets.
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TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED APPROACH AND STATE-OF-THE-ART RESULTS REPORTED ON LIVDET 2011 AND LIVDET 2013
DATASETS FOR CROSS-MATERIAL EXPERIMENTS, IN TERMS OF AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ERROR (ACE) AND FERRFAKE @ FERRLIVE = 1%.
Dataset Spoof Materials State-of-the-Art Proposed Approach
Materials - Training Materials - Testing ACE (%) ACE (%) Ferrfake @ Ferrlive = 1%
Biometrika 2011 EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex Silgum, WoodGlue 10.10 [27] 4.60 8.15
Biometrika 2013 Modasil, WoodGlue EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex 2.10 [28] 1.30 0.34
ItalData 2011 EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex Silgum, WoodGlue, Other 7.00 [28] 5.20 7.80
ItalData 2013 Modasil, WoodGlue EcoFlex, Gelatine, Latex 1.25 [28] 0.60 0.68
Average 5.11 2.93 4.24
3) Cross-Sensor Evaluation: In this evaluation, the training
and the testing images are obtained from two different sensors
but from the same dataset. This setting reflects the algo-
rithm’s strength in learning the common characteristics used
to distinguish live and spoof fingerprints across fingerprint
acquisition devices. For instance, using LivDet 2011 dataset,
images from Biometrika sensor are used for training, and the
images from ItalData sensor are used for testing. We follow
the protocol for selection of training and testing sets for cross-
sensor and cross-dataset experiments as adopted by Nogueira
et al. [27]. Table VIII compares the average classification error
and Ferrfake @ Ferrlive = 1% for the proposed approach with
the results obtained by [27] on cross-sensor experiments.
TABLE VIII
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED APPROACH AND
STATE-OF-THE-ART RESULTS [27] REPORTED ON LIVDET 2011 AND
LIVDET 2013 DATASETS FOR CROSS-SENSOR EXPERIMENTS, IN TERMS OF
AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ERROR (ACE), AND FERRFAKE @ FERRLIVE
= 1%.
Training Dataset
(Testing Dataset)
State-of-the-Art Proposed Approach
ACE (%) ACE (%) Ferrfake (%) @
Ferrlive = 1%
Biometrika 2011
(ItalData 2011)
29.35 [28] 25.35 50.81
ItalData 2011
(Biometrika 2011)
27.65 [28] 25.21 76.20
Biometrika 2013
(ItalData 2013)
1.5 [28] 4.30 12.73
ItalData 2013
(Biometrika 2013)
2.30 [27] 3.50 70.35
Average 15.2 14.59 52.52
4) Cross-Dataset Evaluation: In this scenario, the training
and the testing images are obtained using the same sensor, but
from two different datasets. For instance, training images are
acquired using Biometrika sensor from LivDet 2011 dataset
and the testing images are acquired using Biometrika sensor
from LivDet 2013. This set of experiments captures the
algorithm’s invariance to the changes in environment for data
collection. Table IX presents the average classification error
and Ferrfake @ Ferrlive = 1%. Results in Table IX show that
the proposed local patch based approach achieves a reduction
of 29% in the average classification error from 25.25% in [28]
to 17.91% in our approach. However, the average Ferrfake @
Ferrlive = 1% that we report is 52.52% and 65.06% for cross-
TABLE IX
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED APPROACH AND
STATE-OF-THE-ART RESULTS [28] REPORTED ON LIVDET 2011 AND
LIVDET 2013 DATASETS FOR CROSS-DATASET EXPERIMENTS, IN TERMS
OF AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ERROR (ACE) AND FERRFAKE @
FERRLIVE = 1%.
Training Dataset
(Testing Dataset)
State-of-the-Art Proposed Approach
ACE (%) ACE (%) Ferrfake (%) @
Ferrlive = 1%
Biometrika 2011
(Biometrika 2013)
14.00 [28] 7.60 89.60
Biometrika 2013
(Biometrika 2011)
34.05 [28] 31.16 78.84
ItalData 2011
(ItalData 2013)
8.30 [28] 6.70 16.70
ItalData 2013
(ItalData 2011)
44.65 [28] 26.16 75.09
Average 25.25 17.91 65.06
sensor and cross-dataset scenarios respectively, indicating the
challenges, especially in applications where a high level of
spoof detection accuracy is needed.
C. Processing Times
The MobileNet-v1 CNN model takes around 6-8 hours to
converge using a single Nvidia GTX 1080 Ti GPU utilizing ap-
proximately 96, 000 local patches for a training set with 2, 000
fingerprint images (2, 000 images × 48 patches/fingerprint
image). The average classification time for a single input
image, including minutiae detection, local patch extraction and
alignment, inference of Spoofness Scores for local patches,
and producing the final decision, on a single Nvidia GTX 1080
Ti GPU is 100ms.
IV. FINGERPRINT SPOOF BUSTER
A graphical user interface for real-time fingerprint spoof
detection, called Fingerprint Spoof Buster17, is developed. This
interface allows the operator to select a specific fingerprint
reader and a trained MobileNet-v1 model for evaluation. The
operator can perform the evaluation in either online or batch
mode. In the online mode, a fingerprint is imaged using the
selected reader and displayed on the interface (see Fig. 12).
The extracted fingerprint minutiae and the corresponding local
17This interface will be made available to interested researchers once this
paper is accepted for publication.
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MSUFPAD_MobiNet
CrossMatch Reader
Fig. 12. Interface of the real-time fingerprint spoof detector, called Fingerprint Spoof Buster. It allows selection of the fingerprint reader and CNN model.
patches are presented and color coded based on their respective
spoofness scores (green for live and red for spoof). The global
spoofness score and the final decision for the input image
is also presented on the interface. In the batch mode, all
fingerprint images within a specified directory are evaluated,
and global spoofness scores for each file are output in a file.
The graphical user interface allows the operator to visually
examine the local regions of the fingerprint highlighted as live
or spoof, instead of relying on only a single score as output
by the traditional approaches. In the future, this interface will
be extended to display output from multiple CNN models for
an easy visual comparison.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A robust and accurate method for fingerprint spoof detection
is critical to ensure the reliability and security of the finger-
print authentication systems. In this study, we have utilized
fingerprint domain knowledge by extracting local patches
centered and aligned using minutiae in the input fingerprint
image for training MobileNet-v1 CNN models. The local patch
based approach provides salient cues to differentiate spoof
fingerprints from live fingerprints. The proposed approach is
able to achieve a significant reduction in the error rates for
intra-sensor (63%), cross-material (43%), cross-sensor (4%)
as well as cross-dataset scenarios (29%) compared to state-of-
the-art on public domain LivDet datasets.
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